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We develop a model of manager-employee relationships where em-
ployees care more for their manager when they are more convinced that
their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feel-
ings towards their employees in two ways: by offering a generous wage
and by giving attention. Contrary to the traditional gift-exchange hy-
pothesis, we show that altruistic managers may offer lower wages and
nevertheless build up better social-exchange relationships with their
employees than egoistic managers do. In such equilibria, a low wage
signals to employees that the manager has something else to offer —
namely, a lot of attention — which will induce the employee to stay at
the firm and work hard. Our predictions are well in line with some
recent empirical findings about gift exchange in the field.
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1 Introduction
For many employees, it matters a great deal whether their manager gen-
uinely cares about them as a person or sees them only as a means to an end.
Data from Gallup surveys among a large number of employees and managers
show that employees who feel that their supervisor cares about them as a
person are more satisfied with their job, are less likely to quit, and are better
motivated to work hard (Wagner and Harter 2006). Numerous studies in
organizational psychology and management have reported similar patterns:
When managers show that they care for their employees, social-exchange
relationships develop, which engender effective work behavior, positive em-
ployee attitudes, and organizational commitment (see, e.g., the reviews by
Rhoades and Eisenberger 2002; Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005).
These findings have a clear managerial implication, which can be found
in many popular business books: Managers should build up good personal
relationships with their employees and show that they genuinely care about
them as persons. This, however, is often much easier said than done, for at
least two reasons. First, caring genuinely about an employee is usually not
so much a matter of choice, but rather a matter of the personality of the
manager, the personality fit between the manager and his employee, and
other factors over which the manager has only limited control. Second, even
if a manager truly cares for his employee, he may not always find ways to
credibly signal this, particularly when managers who actually do not care
can pretend that they do. An important issue therefore is: How can caring
managers credibly signal their true feelings to their employees?
The economics literature on manager-worker relationships has so far fo-
cused on the role of wages in engendering employees’ sentiments towards
their manager. The famous gift-exchange hypothesis posits that workers
who are paid higher than market-clearing wages develop sentiment for their
employer and reciprocate the ‘gift’ by working harder (Akerlof 1982). Ar-
bak and Kranich (2007) and Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) have recently
provided microfoundations for this hypothesis by developing models where
altruistic managers signal their feelings by offering higher wages than ego-
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istic managers. Studies in management and organizational psychology have
considered a much broader set of managerial tools facilitating relationship-
building between managers and employees, falling into two broad categories:
economic resources and socioemotional resources. Economic resources ad-
dress "financial needs and tend to be tangible" whereas socioemotional re-
sources address "social and esteem needs (and are often symbolic and par-
ticularistic)." (Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005, p. 881)
This paper provides a game-theoretic analysis of managers’ use of these
two instruments in building up social-exchange relationships with their em-
ployees. We develop a signaling model in the spirit of Levine (1998), where
managers differ in innate altruism towards their employees and employees
are conditionally altruistic towards their manager. That is, employees care
more for their manager (or are less spiteful) when they are more convinced
that their manager genuinely cares about them. Employees form rational
beliefs about their managers’ care by observing the wage they offer and the
socioemotional resources that they give (which we call ‘attention’). Our
key result is that, in any separating equilibrium, altruistic managers al-
ways give more attention than egoistic managers, but need not pay higher
wages. Contrary to the traditional gift-exchange hypothesis, we show that
altruistic managers may offer lower wages and nevertheless build up better
social-exchange relationships with their employees than egoistic managers
do. In such equilibria, low wages signal to employees that the manager has
something else to offer — namely, high socioemotional resources — which will
induce the employee to stay at the firm and work hard.
Our analysis offers an explanation for the disparity between the results
of experimental studies on gift-exchange in the lab and those in the field.
Starting with Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993), numerous laboratory ex-
periments have provided evidence supporting the traditional gift-exchange
hypothesis (see Fehr and Gächter 2000 for an overview). Recent field exper-
iments, however, find little or no effect of paying generous wages on worker’s
productivity (e.g., Gneezy and List 2006; Hennig-Schmidt, Rockenbach, and
Sadrieh 2008). Our theoretical analysis suggests that we should not dismiss
the relevance of gift-exchange in the field on the basis of these findings,
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but rather adopt a broader view on how exchange relationships are formed.
While participants of lab experiments commonly engage in anonymous inter-
actions with money as the only medium of exchange, managers in naturally
occurring workplaces have, in addition to wages, socioemotional tools at
their disposal to build up exchange relationships with their workers. Our
results suggest that application of these tools is often preferred to paying
generous wages and that better manager-worker relationships may go hand
in hand with lower wages. A high wage offer may therefore be interpreted
quite differently in the field than in the lab. Our prediction that symbolic
gifts (such as good personal contact) rather than wages are manager’s main
means of exchange in the field is also well in line with survey evidence by
Campbell and Kamlani (1997) and Bewley (1999) on the determinants of
worker’s morale, as well as with empirical work showing that firms with
bad management-worker relationships are penalized in that they need to
pay higher wages to attract and retain workers (e.g., Borzaga and Depedri
2005). Lastly, a recent field experiment complemented by a questionnaire
study by Kube, Maréchal, and Puppe (2008) finds that a gift-in-kind is sig-
nificantly more likely to signal kind intentions than a wage increase, and —
in contrast to a wage increase — significantly increases worker’s productivity.
The paper is organized as follows. The following section describes the
model. Section 3 presents the main results. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider an economy with two types of managers: altruistic and egoistic.
Altruistic managers care about their profits and about the well-being of the
employees that they hire; egoistic managers care only about profits. Impor-
tantly, while each manager knows his own preferences, an employee cannot
directly observe his manager’s type; employees can only infer a manager’s
type from his actions.
Each manager hires one employee from a sufficiently large pool and takes
two actions: he offers a flat-wage contract and, if the employee has ac-
cepted the contract, he gives attention to his employee. Attention is non-
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contractible and includes all kinds of manager’s actions which are valuable to
the employee, costly to the manager, and not directly related to productive
tasks. Examples of such actions from the business literature are showing
interest in the employee’s personal life, listening to personal problems, pay-
ing respect, and so on. The value of attention to the employee is described
by the strictly increasing and concave function g(a) with g(0) = 0. The
manager’s cost of giving attention is given by f(a), which is increasing and
convex in attention a. Further, we assume that f(0) = fa(0) = 0, where
(throughout the paper) subscripts denote partial derivatives.
After receiving the manager’s attention, the employee has an option to
quit, resulting in outside option direct utility U ≥ 0 for the employee. Quit-
ting implies that the manager is left without any revenues from production,
but need not pay the wage w.1 If the employee stays, he exerts effort e,
which is non-contractible. We allow e to be positive and negative, where
positive e represents extra-role behavior benefiting the manager, while neg-
ative e represents sabotage activities damaging the manager. Effort affects
the manager’s payoff as described by the strictly increasing function q(e),
which is convex for e < 0 and concave for e > 0. Further, we assume that
q(0) > 0; that is, an employee who abstains from extra-role behavior as well
as from sabotage yields positive revenues to the manager. Both positive and
negative e come at a cost to the employee, described by the strictly convex
function c(e), with c(0) = ce(0) = 0.
While managers differ in type, employees are identical. Employees are
conditionally altruistic: An employee is more altruistic (or less spiteful) to-
wards his manager when he is more convinced that his manager is altruistic
towards him. Hence, when a manager’s wage offer and attention make that
employees hold more optimistic beliefs about the manager’s altruism, em-
1Alternatively, we could assume that if the employee quits, he receives βw, 0 < β < 1,
and enjoys outside option utility (1 − β)U , where β measures the time elapsed between
hiring and quitting. This does not affect any of the main results. As we shall see, the em-
ployee’s option to quit implies that the manager’s attention may not only affect work effort
but also turnover. If employees would not have an option to quit, separating equilibria
can arise in which, after receiving attention, employees working for an egoistic manager
actually regret taking the job, but cannot resign.
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ployees’ altruism towards the manager increases.
Summarizing, the manager’s payoff (given that the employee stays) is:
π = q(e)− w − f(a) + α [w − c(e) + g(a)] , (1)
where egoistic managers have α = 0, altruistic managers have α = eα, and
0 < eα < 1. The employee’s expected utility is:
E(U) = E {w − c(e) + g(a) + γ(α) [q(e)− w − f(a)]} , (2)
where E is the expectation operator, −1 < γ(α) < 1 measures the em-
ployee’s altruism or spite towards a manager with altruism α, and our as-
sumption of conditional altruism implies that γ0(α) > 0.2 The timing of the
game is as follows:
1. The manager offers a flat wage contract.
2. If the contract is accepted, the manager gives attention.
3. The employee decides whether to stay and exert effort or quit and
enjoy his outside option utility.
4. Payoffs are realized.
The employee only accepts the contract offered at the beginning of the game
when his expected utility exceeds his outside option utility: E(U) ≥ U . As
to the managers’ outside option, we assume that both altruistic and egoistic
managers always find it optimal to hire an employee.
We focus throughout on the ‘best separating equilibrium’ in pure strate-
gies; that is, we characterize the equilibrium where altruistic managers
2Note that the specification of (1) and (2) follows Levine (1998) in that an altruistic
person does not enjoy an other person’s utility from being altruistic. This avoids some
complexities, but does not affect the main results. Gul and Pesendorfer (2007) have
recently developed a more general model of interdependent preferences, of which Levine’s
(1998) reciprocity model is a special case. Their two main theorems offer an interpretation
of behavioral types as hierarchies of preference responses. Other closely related papers
include Rotemberg (2008), who studies a model where agent’s altruism depends non-
linearly on his perception of the altruism of the person he is interacting with, and Andreoni
and Bernheim (2008), who develop a model where people like to be perceived as fair. The
latter paper also provides experimental evidence for the model’s main predictions.
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through their choice of wage and attention reveal themselves in a way that
brings them highest payoff.3 Clearly, a separating equilibrium in pure strate-
gies may not always exist. For instance, when there are relatively many
altruistic managers in the economy and employee’s responsiveness to man-
ager’s type (γ0(α)) is low, altruistic managers have little or no incentive to
signal their type. Since the aim of our study is to learn how managers may
optimally reveal themselves, we shall focus on situations where the payoff
from doing so is sufficiently high. For brevity, we do not discuss hybrid
equilibria where egoistic managers play mixed strategies.
3 Equilibrium Behavior
We solve for a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium by backward induction, and
so start with the last stage of the game: the employee’s effort choice. In
a separating equilibrium, the employee’s belief about his manager’s type at
the last stage of the game corresponds to the manager’s true type, and so
the first-order condition for optimal effort e∗ reads:
−ce(e∗) + γ(α)qe(e∗) = 0. (3)
Clearly, depending on whether γ is positive or negative, the worker engages
in extra-role behavior (e∗ > 0) or sabotage (e∗ < 0). It is also clear from
(3) that, as a result of employee’s conditional altruism, optimal effort e∗
strictly increases with the manager’s altruism α. In other words, better
manager-worker relations improve workers’ performance, as workers take
more account of their managers’ interest when choosing effort.
Next consider the employee’s decision whether to quit. Comparing his
expected utility of quitting and staying, it follows that the employee stays
3 Inspection of (1) reveals that the single-crossing property is satisfied for both the wage
and attention (πwα = 1 > 0; πaα = ga > 0), implying that both can potentially serve
as signaling instrument. Note also that the separability of the wage and attention in the
payoff functions implies that we need not worry about further signaling conditions that
would be required in a more general set-up.
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if:
w − c [e∗(α)] + γ(α) {q [e∗(α)]− w} ≥ U, (4)
where the direct benefits and costs of attention have dropped out as these
are sunk at this stage. Clearly, an employee with neutral feelings towards
his manager (γ(α) = 0) stays if the wage compensates for foregoing the
outside option and for his effort cost (which is zero in this case). Employees
with warm feelings towards their manager (γ(α) > 0) are willing to stay for a
lower wage, while employees with hostile feelings (γ(α) < 0) require a higher
compensation, unless staying at the firm does more harm to the manager
than quitting does. The latter case, however, is irrelevant in our context,
because anticipating this behavior, a manager would not hire an employee in
the first place. Hence, we can conclude that better manager-worker relations
make it more easy to retain an employee.
The manager’s choice of attention is somewhat more involved, as both
altruistic and signaling motives may play a role. Let us first consider an
egoistic manager. In a separating equilibrium, altruistic manager’s decisions
are such that an egoistic manager has no incentive to mimic. Hence, an
egoistic manager’s optimal attention solves the first-order condition:
−fa(a∗) + αga(a∗) = 0, (5)
which follows from maximizing the manager’s payoff (1) with respect to
attention a, while noting that — given that managers reveal their type —
neither employee effort nor employee retainment depends on manager’s at-
tention (see (3) and (4)). Since egoistic managers do not care about their
employees (α = 0), condition (5) implies that they optimally give no atten-
tion (a∗ = 0).
An altruistic manager’s optimal attention depends on whether signaling
motives are operative at the margin. There are two reasons for why signaling
motives may not be operative in a separating equilibrium. First, altruistic
managers may have already revealed their type through a sufficiently gen-
erous wage offer in the first stage of the game. Second, altruistic managers
may care so much for their employees, that they optimally give more atten-
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tion than necessary to reveal their type. In either case, optimal attention is
described by first-order condition (5) with α = eα; altruistic managers give a
strictly positive level of attention (a∗ > 0) because they enjoy making their
employees happy. Note that attention falls short of the first-best because
the manager cares more about himself than about the worker, eα < 1.4 If, by
contrast, signaling motives are operative at the margin, altruistic managers
raise attention to a level a∗∗ that is just sufficient to keep egoistic managers
from mimicking. The revelation constraint reads:
q [e∗ (0)]− w(0) ≥ q [e∗ (eα)]− w(eα)− f(a∗∗), (6)
where w(α) is the wage offered by a manager with altruism α and e(α)
is employee’s effort as described by (3). If a∗∗ as defined by (6) exceeds
a∗(eα) > 0 as defined by (5), altruistic managers give a∗∗; otherwise, they
give a∗(eα). Hence, altruistic managers always give more attention than
egoistic managers, either for altruistic reasons or for signaling reasons.
Lastly, consider managers’ wage offer in the first stage of the game. It is
easy to verify that, in a separating equilibrium, the employee’s ex ante par-
ticipation constraint (E(U) ≥ U) is always redundant. The reason is simple:
since a manager gives attention after the worker has signed the contract, but
before the worker takes his quit decision, any net benefits from attention re-
lax the participation constraint, but not the retainment constraint. Hence,
if the retainment constraint is satisfied, so is the participation constraint.
Since in a separating equilibrium egoistic managers do not mimic altruistic
managers, they offer a wage that satisfies the retainment constraint (4) with
equality. Altruistic managers face the following optimization problem:
max
w
q(e)− w − f(a) + α [w − c(e) + g(a)] (7)
subject to the retainment constraint (4) and the revelation constraint (6),
and where attention is described by (6) if the revelation constraint binds
4 It is easy to verify that if attention and effort are contractible, and manager’s types
are observable, managers reach first-best profits when the contract specifies attention and
effort such that ga(a)− fa(a) = 0 and qe(e)− ce(e) = 0.
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(a = a∗∗) and by (5) if it does not (a = a∗). The Kuhn-Tucker conditions
to (7) imply that we need to distinguish three cases: 1) the retainment
constraint binds, the revelation constraint does not; 2) both constraints
bind; 3) the revelation constraint is the only binding constraint.5 Let us
discuss these three cases in turn.
In the first case, signaling motives do not impact altruistic managers’
choices. Hence, they give attention a∗(eα) as described by first-order con-
dition (5) and offer a wage that makes their employees just indifferent be-
tween staying and quitting, as described by (4). Clearly, since γ(eα) > γ(0),
it follows from (4) that altruistic managers pay a lower wage than egoistic
managers do (w(eα) < w(0)). This is a compensating wage differential: As
employees derive a nonpecuniary gain from working for a manager that truly
cares for them, they are willing to take and keep the job even though it pays
less than a job offered by an egoistic manager. Moreover, following (3), al-
truistic managers’ employees work harder, resulting in higher revenues from
production (q [e∗ (eα)] > q [e∗ (0)]). Egoistic managers nevertheless do not
mimic altruistic managers when these benefits do not compensate for the
cost of giving attention f [a∗(eα)]. Note that these results square well with
the empirical evidence discussed in the Introduction showing that better
manager-worker relationships are associated with better work performance
and lower wages.
In the second case, the revelation constraint binds so that altruistic man-
agers must be more generous with salary and/or attention so as to signal
their type. Obviously, they want to signal in the least costly way. The
Kuhn-Tucker conditions yield a very simple solution: Altruistic managers
always use attention as a signaling instrument, and only as a last resort
increase the wage as well. The reason for this result is straightforward. In
5The case where neither of the constraints bind is ruled out by the Kuhn-Tucker con-
ditions. However, when assuming concave utility from income and a sufficiently large
difference in income between the manager and the employee, it may happen that altruis-
tic managers optimally leave a rent to their employees even when the revelation constraint
is not binding. Nevertheless, as the retainment constraint is less binding for altruistic man-
agers, they may also in this case pay a lower wage than egoistic managers, and they always
give higher attention.
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the absence of signaling motives, altruistic managers give attention up to
the point where their marginal cost of attention equal their marginal bene-
fit, see (5). Hence, the cost of increasing attention are zero at the margin.
Since a wage increase comes at a cost 1 − eα > 0 to an altruistic manager
(see (1)), attention is always used as a signaling instrument. As attention
increases, the marginal net cost of attention increase as well and, at some
point, increasing the wage becomes a better alternative. Attention and wage
are equally cost-effective if:6
fa(a)
fa(a)− eαga(a) = 11− eα =⇒ fa(a) = ga(a); (8)
that is, where attention reaches its first-best level. Hence, if revelation of
type is still not achieved when fa(a) = ga(a), altruistic managers do not
increase attention any further, but instead increase the wage, implying that
the retainment constraint becomes non-binding. Thus, we end up in the
third case where the revelation constraint is the only binding constraint. In
this third case, the wage offered by altruistic managers may become higher
than the wage offered by egoistic managers; in the second case, altruistic
managers always offer lower wages than egoistic managers. In either case,
altruistic managers give more attention than egoistic managers.
4 Concluding Remarks
We have studied gift-exchange between managers and workers in a model
where managers can signal their altruism towards their workers by offering
high wages and by giving attention. Our analysis predicts a prominent role
for attention and other socioemotional resources in gift-exchange relation-
ships. Generous wages may complement these non-monetary gifts, but they
6This follows from differentiating (1) — implying that altruistic managers’ net costs
of increasing attention and of increasing the wage are fa(a) − hαga(a) and 1 − hα > 0,
respectively — and differentiating (6) — implying that the ‘signaling benefits’ of increas-
ing attention and of increasing the wage are fa(a) and 1, respectively. The Kuhn-Tucker
conditions imply that managers optimally use the instrument(s) which achieve highest sig-
naling benefits per unit net cost. Hence, managers are indifferent between the instruments
when (8) holds.
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are used only when egoistic managers have strong incentives to mimic altruis-
tic managers. When these incentives are moderate (e.g., because employee’s
responsiveness to manager’s type is relatively low), altruistic managers pay
lower wages than egoistic managers do, as employees derive a nonpecuniary
gain from working for a manager who truly cares for them.
Our results depend crucially on the non-contractibility of manager’s at-
tention. If attention would be contractible, it is always set at the first-best
level, and so wages are a more efficient signaling instrument than attention.
However, when we make the additional assumption that altruistic managers
are more efficient than egoistic managers in non-monetary gift-giving (as
in Camerer 1988; Prendergast and Stole 2001; Ellingsen and Johannesson
2007), contractibility of attention does not change our results qualitatively.
In that case, attention will always be used for signaling purposes, and the
wage paid by managers who truly care for their employees may well be lower
than the wage paid by narrowly self-interested managers.
The analysis can be extended in several other interesting directions,
yielding new testable predictions. First, in addition to increasing employee’s
effort and reducing turnover, a manager’s altruism can bring about other
benefits (see Rotemberg 2006 for a survey). For instance, Rotemberg and
Saloner (1993) show that, when contracts are incomplete, manager’s altru-
ism can improve incentives for employees to engage in innovation activities
and thus can increase profits. Hence, in environments that are rich in inno-
vation opportunities, the signaling activities studied in this paper may have
a higher return and may thus be more prevalent than in environments with
few innovation opportunities. Second, a manager’s span of control may affect
how fast his marginal cost of attention increase with attention. Following
condition (8), this may imply that managers with a larger span of control
are more likely to use wages on top of attention to signal their type. Like-
wise, the marginal value of manager’s attention may decrease more rapidly
for some workers than for others, and the inclination to reciprocate may
differ among people, possibly depending on one’s own kindness, as in the
reciprocity model of Gul and Pesendorfer (2007). Lastly, a challenging is-
sue is the sorting of people with different motivations into management and
11
employee positions, and the matching of these types in equilibrium.
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